Abstract-Virtualization, after having found widespread adoption in the server and desktop arena, is poised to change the architecture of embedded systems as well. The benefits afforded by virtualization -enhanced isolation, manageability, flexibility, and security -could be instrumental for developers of embedded systems as an answer to the rampant increase in complexity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, innovations first took place in the desktop and server market before they trickled down to embedded systems some years later. Although the gap in capabilities is likely to persist, high-end embedded devices more and more resemble desktop systems in term of hardware (compute power, memory sizes) and software (general purpose operating systems, open system architecture). Assuming that this follow-suit trend is to continue, it should not be too long before virtualization gains traction in embedded devices. Before dwelling on real-time characteristics, we would like to briefly recite the arguments for virtualization in embedded devices.
A. The Case for Virtualization in Embedded Systems
Development support. Tight time-to-market times can only be achieved though pervasive software reuse. Despite all efforts, dependencies between software components are often intricate, requiring substantial development effort when changes are needed. Moreover, quite a few applications hinge on particular operating systems, or even specific versions of them. Virtualization obviates the need to settle for one operating system, but instead allows to run multiple of them in parallel. The easy reuse of tried-and-tested components will cut down on the development effort thereby reducing costs and shortening the time-tomarket.
Platform migration. In the past, more powerful devices automatically translated into better functionality. The recent tendency to multicore processors makes that benefit increasingly harder to reap as only multithreaded software benefits from the presence of additional cores. Virtualization opens up the opportunity to eschew the daunting task of porting single-core software stacks, instead reusing it outright. Generally, the introduction of virtualization into the system stack requires only the hypervisor to be ported to new devices; the higher layers need only small adoptions or none at all.
Security. Traditionally, security from non-physical attacks was not a major concern for embedded systems.
Even if a device contained defects, these were difficult to exploit as the usual attack vector -network connectivity -was unheard-of. That has changed profoundly in the recent past. High-end embedded systems more and more resemble desktop systems regarding computing capabilities, usage scenarios, and connectivity. The applications they accommodate share many traits with those found on desktops, security vulnerabilities included. Security-wise, the calm past has given way to a frantic struggle between attackers raking about for exploitable deficiencies and defenders hurrying for closing them promptly. While security threats against desktops are severe, they hold the potential to be devastating for embedded systems. Unlike the stationary cousins, embedded systems often are restricted in their means to repulse malware. Installing an new version of an anti-virus solution is just not on the table. Given the gravity of the situation and the inevitability of its occurence, it is urgent to tighten the defences. Virtualization may provide the isolation needed to contain an attacker, thus offering deeper defense. The feasibility of this approach has been borne out by contemporary gaming consoles, where hypervisor-based security architectures have proven sufficiently capable of denying ultimate control to flocks of highly motivated attackers. Consolidation. Today it is not uncommon to physically separate subsystems to ensure non-interference. The downside is that the number of control units grows which raises concerns as to the bill of material, weight of wiring, and reliability in the face of numerous physical connections, which are vulnerable to aging.
License separation. Platform vendors are often concerned about their system architecture not to be revealed to competitors. For that reason, they do not like the publication of, say, device drivers as these may give hints at the underlying hardware. This attitude is at odds with some important open source operating systems, which require source code access for device drivers. The tension can be eased if software with intellectual property rights restrictions is placed in a VM where it is not subject to licenses requiring source access.
Partial Validation. If the interaction between components cannot be characterized precisely, then a tightly integrated system has to be revalidated as a whole whenever any single component is changed. Conversely, as long as component interaction is limited to well-defined interfaces (including temporal aspects), it is sufficient to check whether a component adheres to the interface specification. Changes of a component then would not require a system validation.
Remote Management. The growing device complexity makes it ever more likely that some unexpected situation arises after the device is shipped. Therefor it would be desirable to remotely assess the situation and take remedial measures. It the best case, the issue is fixed by a remotely initiated update before the user even notices that something was about to break. For all its virtues, remote management cuts both ways. If not properly secured, a remote management interface is a downright invitation for attackers to take over the device. As such, it must be ensured that only properly authorized requests are honored. There should be a secure anchor in the platform, which cannot be even disabled if an attacker has already succeeded in penetrating some parts of the system.
B. Challenges for Embedded Virtualization
Embedded devices differ from their desktop and server cousins in that they are often charged with tasks that require interacting with their environment in real-time. The transition from special-purpose realtime operating systems to general purpose operating systems like Linux poses enough problems in itself in that respect. Virtualization requires modifications deep in the software stack. In order to hurt realtime performance not too much the following three problems have to be taken into account.
First, virtualization support in current processors comes in the shape of additional processor privilege levels 1 . Not only have incoming event now to traverse more modes (CPUs deliver events normally to the most privileged mode), the state transitions also take longer due to the huger state involved. With current hardware, these additional expensive transitions in timing-critical paths are inevitable and will lead to increases in eventhandling latencies.
Second, the relative cost of individual operation changes, which requires a redesign of timing critical paths. For example, on a non-virtualized platform arming a timer takes a trap into the operating system kernel and a device access. In a virtual machine, a guest is not allowed to access the physical timer directly because of contention from other guests. Attempts to access the device trap into the hypervisor, which takes care of multiplexing the physical timer. Unfortunately, this costly operation is in critical event handling paths. An alternative is to let the hypervisor arm the timer speculatively when it injects an event. The guest OS can then resume the event handler process without the delay incurred during setting the (virtual) timer.
Lastly, the hypervisor has to be aware of the internal operations of a VM. Assume a process in a VM that runs with the highest priority and shall complete execution as fast as possible. Further assume that, during the execution of that process, an IRQ arrives. The hypervisor takes over control and dispatches the event to the virtual machine monitor 2 , which in turn injects it into the VM. Only then the decision is taken that the event does not bear on the scheduling configuration and the high priority task is resumed. At that point an appreciable amount of time has elapsed due to the privilege changes and context switches . Had the hypervisor or the VMM had the information that the IRQ does not affect the current scheduling decision in the VM, either one could have abstained from forwarding the event and instead directly resumed the interrupted activity. This short-circuiting, though, is only possible if it is known that a high priority process is executing. Otherwise, forwarding the event is the correct action. As the architecturally defined VM interface does not convey this kind of information, additional interfaces are needed to bridge the semantic gaps that opens up between hypervisor, VMM, and guest VM.
C. Goal and Outline
Our goal was to build a system with the following properties:
1) The trusted computing base -the set of all hardware, firmware, and software components that are critical security and safety of a systemshall be small. It is well accepted that a reduction in complexity is instrumental in building reliable systems. 2 We assume that the VMM runs as a user-level task.
2) Given the scarcity of native applications for security-conscious environments, the reuse of legacy software shall be easily possible. As virtualization is by definition compatible with a huge body of software and exhibits good performance characteristics, the system shall support multiple virtual machines. 3) One of this virtual machines shall be able to pick up promptly on incoming events. The hosted guest shall see event-handling latencies that are within a reasonable range of that seen on physical hardware.
The contribution of this paper is twofold: first, we present a software stack that takes into account both real-time and security requirements. We assess the impact of this arrangement on real-time workloads running in a VM.
In the second part, we investigate how real-time behavior can be improved if the guest provides hints regarding its real-time operations. Although such hints require guest modifications, we found that these modifications can be kept to a minimum and improve significantly on the real-time performance.
II. BACKGROUND
Requirements regarding security, fault-tolerance, and real-time performance can only be met if the lowest layer in the software stack, the operating system kernel, provides proper support. One long-standing quarrel on this issue is whether monolithic kernels can be adequately evolved or a shift towards microkernels is the better choice. While a huge part of the OS community recognizes the principal superiority of the microkernel design, many point out that monolithic kernels can catch up and retain their performance advantage.
A. Microkernels
Operating system kernels are a critical component in the software stack. Kernels find themselves in the situation that they have to guarantee safety and security for all applications running on top of them, yet cater to specific needs of single applications. Applications often have very specific requirements, which are not easily conveyed through the syscall interface. An operating system would like to hand over the resource management to applications as that would allow to apply arbitrary policies without adversely affecting non-participating parties.
A microkernel is an operating system kernel that contains only those mechanisms needed to implement a complete operating system on top. Typically these mechanisms include address space management, scheduling, and message passing. Other functionality such as device drivers, protocol stacks, and file systems is provided by user-level servers. The upside of this approach is that resources can be selectively allocated to user-level tasks, which then can manage them at their discretion.
While hailed as the future of operating systems, microkernels have not supplanted monolithic kernels across the board. Although many experimental microkernels demonstrated the potential benefits, neither one saw enough take-up, which would have been necessary for a self-sustaining software ecosystem. Furthermore, systems built on monolithic kernels kept their performance edge and had some of their deficiences alleviated. For example, the often raised point of lacking flexibility was answered by the introduction of kernel modules. The lack of success on desktops and servers notwithstanding, microkernels made their way into systems that care about security and scheduling.
Scheduling: When a computation involving updates of multiple variables can be preempted, further synchronization mechanisms have to be employed to ensure consistency. While lockless schemes such as RCU [1] and lock-free synchronization [2] have an edge over classical lock-based synchronization in certain cases, the latter is easier to understand and thus prevalent.
Retrofitting preemptibility into monolithic kernels by adding locks to data structures is tedious because assumptions as to atomic execution are usually deeply entrenched and non-obvious. Deadlock situations may arise if the lock grabbing sequence does not rule out circular dependencies. If the objects to be protected come into being and perish at a high rate, coming up with a suitable lock ordering is far from trivial. The situation is aggravated if long running operations shed held locks intermittently and reacquire them before resuming. Such a courtesy may be imperative, though, if operations with tighter timing requirements require prompt access. Furthermore, for most real systems, event-handling latencies are not an overriding priority and thus must not hurt throughput performance too much. As a consequence, the number of locks in often-used code paths has to be limited, which may result in longer lock-protected paths. The problem was encountered by developers of the PREEMPT RT flavor of the Linux kernel. Up to 15% performance degradation [3] was enough to stir opposition against mainline inclusion.
Given the difficulties of directly improving on the preemptibility of an existing kernel, it may be expedient to absolve it from scheduling and assign that task to a real-time scheduler. For that purpose, a shim is interposed between the old kernel and the hardware, taking over the primary responsiblity for scheduling. The old kernel is -from a scheduling point of viewrelegated to a real-time tasks. As such, it can stop the flow of events from the shim to it. However, it cannot prevent events arriving at the shim and triggering scheduling decisions there.
The idea has gained some momentum, both in open source and commercial project. One of the first projects along this architecture was RTLinux [4] . RTAI [5] and its successor, the Xenomai project followed suit. The downside of this approach is that the shim only takes over scheduling but does not assume control over memory management. Memory management still lies with the host kernel, in these cases Linux. Real-time tasks are loaded into the Linux kernel and become subject to the real-time scheduling after initialization. The common residency in kernel space means that crashes are not contained in address spaces. Xenomai tries to mitigate the issue by optionally placing realtime applications in address spaces. While faults of other real-time tasks become survivable, crashes in the Linux kernel are still fatal.
The next step is not only to confer scheduling to the shim but also hand the responsibility for memory management completely over to it. That would strengthen the surviveability of the system as more parts are subject to address space isolation. The downside is that this encapsulation carries the cost of privilege level transitions in critical paths. Nonetheless, many system have adopted that architecture, among them QNX Neutrino [6] , PikeOS [7] , and L4 [8] .
Security: Monolithic kernels have grown to a complexity were it becomes intractable to reason about all possible interactions in the kernel. Given that each defect may be used to gain control over the kernel, such a situation is a security nightmare. In contrast, small kernels are more amenable to thorough examination, which instills confidence regarding their correctness. This scrutiny can be even taken as far as to have them undergo formal verification [9] .
A prerequisite for a small trusted computing base, a small kernel alone is not sufficient, though. Rather it is necessary that privileged user level servers cannot be tricked into exercising their authority on behalf of a malevolent party. This issue -widely known as confused deputy problem -can be ascribed to the separation of naming and privilege.
Capabilities facilitate the construction of system that honour the pinciple of least authority. Despite their undenied advantages, capabilities have not found their way into mainstream operating systems. The reason for that might well be that capabilities are not compatible and thus cannot retrofitted into the APIs of mainstream OSs. A recent effort by Watson at al [10] shows promise to make deeper inroads but is yet in early stages.
Researchers, who have not to take legacy APIs into consideration, were more successful with creating conceptually clean systems. The first system that featured a small kernel and capability-based access control, EROS [11] , was followed by more systems with these traits [12] [13] .
B. Virtualization
Microkernel-based systems are relatively novel under active development and as such still in a state of flux. An steadily changing kernel interface, though, is a difficult target for user-level components. Although native system frameworks have come into existence, they cannot rival existing operating system in features, maturity, and application availability. To make up this deficiency, system designers have chosen to reuse whole operation systems with virtualization the most promising technique.
A virtual machine is an software environment which is capable of executing applications together with their operating systems. A virtual machine implements the same instruction-set architecture as real hardware, a guest cannot distinguish whether it runs natively or under virtualization. While this requirement can also be met by performance-sapping emulation, virtual machines are required to exhibit near-native performance. This requirement translates into the huge majority of instructions being executed directly by the host hardware. Complementing equivalence and performance is control. The virtualization layer always retains full control over the system. To that end the part of the VM in control -the hypervisorinterposes on operations that impinge upon system resources such as memory or IO devices. Instead of accessing the physical resource, the guest is provided with virtual surrogates. As encapsulation is an explicit virtualization goal, virtual machines naturally lend themselves to serve as a unit of isolation.
The advantages of virtualization come at a cost, though. Virtual machines operate in special processor modes which incur substantial overhead when entered or left. While also being a problem for systems aiming at throughput, these world switching costs can add substantially to the length of critical paths of real-time applications if these were to run in VMs.
Apart from hardware-induced costs, software-related costs have to be considered, too. Latencies incurred by executing non-preemptible code paths within the layers implementing the VM will add to those caused by the OS kernel in the VM. For this reason, it is not recommendable to use so-called hosted VMMs, where an existing operating system is extended with hypervisor functionaltiy. Bare-metal hypervisors can be implemented as microkernels and as such have much less code in timing-critical execution paths.
While bringing hardware and (direct) software costs under control is necessary, it is not sufficient, though. One severe problem with virtualization architectures is that the machine interface does not propagate highlevel information, an issue also known as semantic gap. For example, on bare hardware, there is no need for an operating system to let the hardware know that there is a highly prioritized real-time application runnable. In contrast, under virtualization, a guest disabling interrupts achieves only that no events arrive in its VM. The system still accepts them and queues them until they can be delivered. While the guest performs correctly, it does not as fast as it could as interrupt arrival entails costly world switches. If the lower layers were aware that real-time tasks are active, they could disable (at least) some events in order to expedite the guest execution. The information that a real-time task is active is not easily derived by the host, thus it has to be signaled by the guest.
III. DESIGN
We will start the description of our design by covering the hypervisor and those features with a bearing on real-time operations in VMs. Thereafter we will elaborate on our virtual machine monitor. The chapter is wrapped up with the explanation of the changes we made to the guest.
Before we set out to detail our design, we will take up an issue that often gives rise to confusion. While often used interchangeably, the terms hypervisor and virtual machine monitor signify two distinctively different components in our architecture. More confusingly, sometimes the hypervisor is used synonymously with microkernel.
A hypervisor enforces isolation, that is it implements protection domains, VMs being one flavor of them. For doing so, it needs to exercise exclusive control over data structures that control isolation such as page tables and entry vectors. This is only possible if it runs in the the most privileged CPU execution mode 3 as only this mode has full control over critical system resources such as control registers.
A microkernel applies the principle of minimality to the portion of software running in the most privileged execution mode. We understand microkernel and hypervisor complementary. Hypervisor implies a function whereas microkernel denotes a particular design principle. As such, a microkernel can assume the role of a hypervisor, or conversely, a hypervisor can be implemented as microkernel.
A virtual machine monitor provides VMs with functionality beyond CPU and memory virtualization, which is the duty of the hypervisor. Typically, the VMM supplies a VM with (virtual) devices and coordinates its execution. Contrary to a hypervisor, which always requires maximal CPU privileges, a VMM can be either part of the kernel or implemented as a user task.
A. Hypervisor
Our architecture builds on Fiasco.OC [12] , a stateof-the-art microkernel of L4 provenance. As typical for microkernels, it only provides basic functionality such as address space construction, and inter-process communication (IPC), and scheduling. All the remaining aspects such as device drivers and protocol stacks, which are included in monolithic kernels, are relegated into user level servers where they are subject to address space containment. Under this arrangement, a device driver failure, which is likely fatal in monolithic systems, becomes survivable.
The original Unix security model, which served as a role model for many contemporary systems, does not allow for mandatory access control (MAC). Each data owner may release data to arbitrary third parties at his discretion without a system-wide imposed security policy being able to prevent that. Efforts to add mandatory access control mechanisms such as SELinux have proven difficult and are widely deemed inpractical. In contrast, Fiasco.OC features capabilitybased access control [12] , which highly expedient for the construction of systems that follow the princple of least authority.
Fiasco.OC can be used as an hypervisor [14] [15] . In line with the microkernel philosophy, it only provides support for CPU and memory virtualization and leaves the provisioning of virtual devices to a user-level virtual machine monitor (VMM). It should be pointed out that virtualization blends smoothly with the existing system. Memory is provisioned into VMs the same way as it is into non-VM protection domains. Access to VMs is governed by the same capability mechanism that controls access to any other object in the system. Executing code in a VM is achieved through a thread and as such under control of the Fiasco scheduler.
The object describing address spaces, the task, is also used to provide the memory context for a VM. The only modification is that the VM memory range covers the full 4GB on 32bit architectures whereas tasks are limited to 3GB. Each virtual machine has an associated controller task, which controls its execution thereby acting as a virtual machine monitor (VMM). Unlike tasks, VMs cannot host threads directly. Instead, the thread is bound to the controller task and migrates into the VM when execution shall there resume. To that end it invokes a microkernel syscall with a capability to the VM object and a full architectural VM state as arguments. This operation is reverted when an external event arrives or a situation occurs that needs attention. The last execution state of is then reported back.
From its inception, Fiasco was developed with realtime support in mind. The kernel disables interrupts only for inavoidable atomic operations (e. g. thread switching) and is thus highly preemptible. Scheduling of threads is strictly based on static priorities.
Streamlined synchronous IPC was one of the defining characteristics of the original L4 and later derived kernels. The reasoning was that communication is mainly procedure-call-like and that asynchronous event handling is so rare that kernel support is not warranted. It turned out that the premise does not hold for operating system kernels. Consequently, the kernel's threading model was augmented with a virtual CPU mode [16] , which proved very expedient for OS rehosting. The underlying principle is that control transfer between two tasks 4 only takes place if there are no pending interrupts. That mirrors the behavior of physical machines, where transitioning from kernel into user level is and allowing interrupt delivery is usually an atomic operation. Earlier designs lacking that feature could ignore pending events for a whole time slice, which is unacceptable for real-time operations. For our work, the scope of this conditional operation was extended to the switch into VM operation.
B. Virtual Machine Monitor
Instead of starting from scratch, we opted to improve on the Karma VMM [15] . We identified parts of Karma that might delay the delivery of events into the guest and replaced them.
Our first modification concerned the timer handling. Originally, Karma used Fiasco IPC timeouts as time source. For historic reasons, Fiasco's timer granularity is rather coarse at 1000Hz. Clearly such a clock source is inadequate to serve as a time source for a highresolution Linux timer. Since changing the Fiasco timer infrastructure was beyond our scope, we decided to offer a higher-resolution timer as an alternative. Our choice was fell on the HPET. Ownership over the device is given to one karma instance, whereby it is allowed to program it directly and subscribe as a recepient of its interrupts. Whenever the guest OS tries to program its (virtual) timer, these accesses are intercepted. The VMM retrieves the timeout to be set from the guest's execution state and arms the HPET accordingly. When the time has elapsed, the HPET raises an interrupt. Fiasco forwards it to the VMM, Step 8: woken guest task is resumed.
which, in turn, injects it as a virtual interrupt into the VM under its control.
Since the VMM is a regular task it does not have direct device access. Instead it uses services provided by infrastructure servers. In many cases, service invocation involves sending messages (interprocess communication, IPC). Unfortunately, most of the currently used infrastructure employs synchronous IPC to a certain degree.
However, a VMM does not fit well into this model. A VM may accommodate multiple processes, each of which can potentially initiate communication with other servers (by accessing virtual devices). Since IPC response times are not guaranteed to be short 5 , it could happen that any activity in the VMM came to an halt for a substantial period of time. Any incoming event was delayed until an IPC reply arrived. To avoid these delays we employ a dedicated thread for external IPC. The main thread still detects the request from the guest, but instead of sending the IPC itself it leaves that task to the communication thread. The important point in this construction is that the main thread gets not tied up in an IPC and can promptly pick up on incoming events.
IV. OPTIMIZATIONS
Our most important optimization concerned the delay incurred by reprogramming the timer source. Usually Linux sets a new timeout promptly after the arrival of a timer interrupt, i. e. directly in interrupt context before resuming any (possibly real-time) process. The sequence of events is shown in Figure 1 . Since programming the timer involves leaving and reentering the VM and is thus a costly operation, the guest was adapted to check whether the expired timer is about to wake a real-time task and to postpone the timer programming until after the task's execution in these cases. This allowed us to move the steps 4-7 off the critical path. Once the real-time task has completed, Karma is asked to set the next timeout. From the guest's perspective this behavior is correct because the real-time load runs with the highest priority and cannot be preempted by any other process. If the timeout has not led to a wake-up of a real-time task, the timer is programmed immediately as usual. Karma takes provisions against run-away processes by setting an emergency timeout that is far larger than the worst-case execution time of the current job. Either a regular time rearming or the completion notification of the real-time task will let Karma cancel the emergency timeout.
Our second set of optimizations aimed at reducing the overhead caused by lower-priority interrupts arriving during execution of a real-time task. As the initial version of Karma injected interrupts into the VM in a strict FIFO manner, the first improvement was to sort the pending interrupts and deliver the one with the highest priority first, thereby retaining hardware semantics up to the VMM-VM interface, and holding back the pending interrupts with lower priorities. Once the VM reprograms the timer, Karma can be sure that the real-time task has completed its time slice and deliver the interrupts. For the next iteration we allowed Karma to preclude the microkernel from delivering low-priority events to the virtual machine altogether. The occurrence of such events still causes a VM exit and reentry in this scenario, but the additional context switch to Karma is inhibited. Once the real-time task has completed and the VM has announced to Karma that event processing can resume, the microkernel delivers the events to Karma which in turn injects them into the guest. As a final step, we allowed Karma to use the system's hardware task priority register (TPR) to directly inhibit the generation of hardware interrupts below a chosen priority. This scenario finally also saves the costly VM exits and reentries during the execution of high-priority code by keeping interrupts pending right on the interrupt controller.
V. EVALUATION
To evaluate the feasibility of our design, we ran a number of experiments. Our test machine mounted a AMD Phenom II X4 3.4GHz, 4GB RAM (DDR3, 1333MHz) on a Gigabyte GA-770TA-UD3 board, and a Hitachi hard disk (500GB, 7200rpm, 16MB cache). The virtual machines were provided with 256MB RAM.
The guest running the realtime load was running linux version 3.0.14-rt31 with the PREEMPT RT [17] and Karma patches applied. In the guest VM, we used cyclictest [18] (version 0.83), a utility waking up periodically and measuring the deviation from the expected wakeup time. These delays are a good measure for the preemptibility of the operating system. Our version of cyclictest is slightly modified in that it reports the measured delay directly through a hypercall to Karma. Unless noted otherwise, the load was generated in the same VM with "tar -xf linux.tar.bz2" unpacking a disk-resident archive. For comparision, we ran the same Linux configuration except for the Karma patches on bare hardware. If not noted otherwise, all measurements ran for one hour.
For our experiments, the guest running timesharing loads was granted direct disk access, but had to use the secure GUI as console. The GUI server has to copy the framebuffer content of a client into the device framebuffer. Without the decoupling described in subsection III-B, it would not be possible to provide the user with a responsive user interface and run realtime tasks with tight deadlines at the same time.
Fiasco.OC offers a tracebuffer, which holds kernel generated and user supplied logging messages. It can be made visible as read-only region in the address spaces of user-level tasks. We made extensive use of this facility as time-stamped log messages were often the only way to pinpoint causes of long delays.
A. Base Line Measurements
Our first measurement differs from the others in that it is the only one not concerned with latencies. While not the primary target, throughput is nonetheless of interest. Figure 2 lists the times it takes to compile the Linux kernel. The figures are only meant to gain an understanding of relative performance, as the imposed limitations (one CPU, 256MB memory) certainly hurt. The result of approximately 3.5% slowdown is consistent with earlier results [15] . Figure 2 . Linux kernel compile benchmark, in seconds, smaller is better. At least three runs were performed. All setups were limited to one CPU and 256MB memory. In the case of Karma, disk accesses were carried out directly without VMM intervention. In our next measurement, we ran the guest in the base configuration as shown in figures 3 and 4. The important point to note is that the worst-case latency under load increases less than twofold for the virtualized case (14µs vs. 25µs).
B. Bridging the Semantic Gap
In this chapter we demonstrate how the real-time performance can be improved if the actions of the guest and the layers underneath it are better coordinated. Figure 5 shows how the programming of the simulated local APIC timer is rather expensive. By deferring the timer reprogramming until the realtime workload has finished, we can improve the release latency of the realtime workload dramatically.
There are however situations which can not be improved by postponing the reprogramming. Usually Linux refrains from programming the timer if the required delay is so small that it can not be reliably programmed; but it does not take the expensive roundtrip to the VMM into account. Thus if Linux calls out to the VMM in order to reprogram the timer for a delay that is above its own programming threshold but less than the actual time required to exit and reenter the VM, Karma will refuse to program the device and directly inject a synthetic timer event into the VM. This saves the additional delay of programming the timer chip, but the costs incurred by leaving and reentering the VM cannot be remedied. The latencies experienced during such a series of events (termed a "soft trigger" as opposed to a "hard trigger", which means an actual hardware timer interrupt) are shown in Figure 6 . In the future, we will try to reliably detect close timeouts in Linux. In such situation it might be better to poll instead of calling the hypervisor.
Upon an HPET interrupt, Fiasco raises the TPR 6 value such that only its own timer interrupts for scheduling can pass. If the HPET interrupt results in the release of an event handler, then it can run without interference from device interrupts. After the handler has signaled the VMM its completion, the latter unmasks the HPET. Fiasco also detects this and lowers the TPR to the regular level. Figure 7 shows the the effect of that procedure. The worst case latencies grow by 6µs if the TPR optimization is disabled. soft-triggered hard-triggered Figure 6 . Latency comparison of interrupts delivered directly from the hardware ("hard trigger") against interrupts synthesized by Karma when the desired wakeup time has already been reached ("soft trigger"). The figure on top shows the latencies on an otherwise idle system, the bottom one on a system with a device interrupt inducing load. Delayed timer programming is active in both setups. 
C. Isolation at VM Level
In our final measurement we investigated whether load running in a separate VM has an impact on the real-time latencies. To that end, we ran our workload in a second VM with a Linux 2.6.35.2 and Karma patches applied. Figure 8 shows the meaurement results alongside measurements with load running in the realtime VM. We put the higher latencies down to heavier pressure on caches and TLBs.
VI. RELATED WORK
Linux has been used in quite a few projects to serve as the general purpose part in a hybrid system [4] [19] [5] . Limited to scheduling, the real-time layer has to rely on the Linux kernel for services like program loading or memory access. To circumvent the intricate user-level management of Linux, which involves paging, real-time tasks are often implemented as kernel modules. Kernel memory is not paged under Linux, the real-time executive can be sure that a once-loaded task is resident. Since all real-time applications run in the same kernel address space, faults cannot be contained with address spaces. Although recent versions of Xenomai offer user-level real-time applications, they still limit them to a specific API. Maintaining more than the Linux API is seen as too cumbersome by many developers, though. Regardless of whether user tasks are encapsulated, the Linux kernel runs in kernel space in any case. Its immense size makes the presence of defects, especially in device drivers, highly likely.
Kiszka [20] evaluates the use of Linux as a real-time hypervisor. Using KVM and Linux-RT as a host and a guest system latencies are evaluated. A paravirtualized scheduling interface is introduced to improve the scheduling in the guest. The evaluations show that reasonable scheduling latencies can be achieved.
Rehosting an operating system on top of a microkernel has been investigated before [21] [22] [23] . The approach reflects the lacking hardware virtualization support at the time. On architectures without tagged TLBs, performance is noticably degraded because of the context switch now necessary for a (guest) kernel entry. Still, it is possible to achieve reasonable guest event-handling latencies with such approaches [24] .
Bruns at al [25] evaluated the application of a microkernel based system for real-time. A rehosted RTOS was run on a commercially available embedded platform and compared to its native version. The evaluation showed that the benefits of consolidation outweighed the performance impact of the virtualization approach.
EROS [11] demonstrated that a capability system can be built on a small kernel and yield message passing performance on a par with other then state-of-the-art microkernels. Unlike other systems that expose disk space through a file system, EROS went for a persistent model. That state of the system resides primarily on disk and is only fetched into memory for execution. This classical example for caching entails making decisions which objects are kept in memory and which are written back to disk. EROS did not provide any mechanisms to influence this caching, giving real-time applications no chance to ensure they stay memoryresident.
Mesovirtualization, proposed by Ito and Oikawa in [26] , is a virtualization approach targeted at the x86 architecture that minimally changes the guest operating system. As a guest they apply Linux on their VMM implementation Gandalf, and show a better performance when comparing with Linux on Xen, attributing their advance to their annotations.
In [27] Ito and Oikawa have implemented and evaluated shadow page-table implementations in the Gandalf VMM. They achieve better results than Xen, however they modify the page handling code of their Linux guest.
Kinebuchi et al. [28] propose task grain scheduling to host a Linux and an RTOS on an L4 based hypervisor on embedded systems. The guests are adapted to run in this environment and priorities of guest tasks are mapped to host ones. Their evaluation shows that interrupt latency is increased significantly compared to a native RTOS.
The current excitement for virtualization obscures the fact that the layers need to implement virtual machines may grow the attack surface, rendering the system as whole even more vulnerable. Peter at al [29] have shown that kernel support can be added to microkernels with minimal effort without undermining the security properties of the system. This work did not seek to minimize the trusted computing base for the VM itself, though, which was demonstrated later [13] . Liebergeld at al [15] further demonstrated that virtualization does not hurt the real-time performance of application running alongside the VM. The feasibility of the VM to support real-time applications inside was not investigated.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented an architecture that allows for the execution of real-time tasks in a virtual machine. Our results indicate that real-time performance comparable to loads run on bare hardware is only possible if the guest can give hints at its current execution status to lower layers of the software stack.
